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The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace
Peter R. Lavoy
Five decades ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented a bold and imaginative nuclear initiative to the United
Nations. Although the “Atoms for Peace” plan was immensely popular and fundamentally altered the way the world
treated nuclear energy, some contemporary observers contend that the policies and capabilities it produced
inadvertently fueled the global spread of nuclear arms. As Leonard Weiss recently wrote, “[I]t is legitimate to ask
whether Atoms for Peace accelerated proliferation by helping some nations achieve more advanced arsenals than
would have otherwise been the case. The jury has been in for some time on this question, and the answer is yes.”[1]
This contention is correct but somewhat incomplete. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s policies did hasten the
international diffusion of scientific and industrial nuclear technology, and some recipient nations—Israel, India, and
Pakistan—did divert U.S. nuclear assistance to military uses. On the other hand, Atoms for Peace produced many of
the most important elements of today’s nuclear nonproliferation regime: the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the concept of nuclear safeguards, and most importantly, the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. In the final
analysis Eisenhower was no more or less successful than his successors in trying to balance the possession and
possible use of nuclear forces for America’s defense with efforts to discourage other countries from acquiring
nuclear weapons.
Truman’s Legacy: Technology Denial and Secrecy
The U.S. government was concerned about the diffusion of nuclear weapons technology and materials even before it
manufactured its first nuclear explosives for possible military use in the Second World War. In order to prevent
Germany, Japan, or Russia from acquiring the expertise or materiel required to make nuclear bombs, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt placed the Manhattan bomb development project under strict secrecy—so secret, in fact, that
his vice president, Harry Truman, was unaware of the bomb’s existence until after Roosevelt’s death.[2] The high
stakes of the nuclear race with Germany, however, soon led Washington to collaborate with its closest wartime
allies, Great Britain and Canada. The world’s first nuclear nonproliferation accord, the secret Quebec agreement of
August 1943, committed the Atlantic allies not to communicate any atomic information or share sensitive technology
or materials with third parties without mutual consent.[3] 
When the United States was nearing completion of its first nuclear device, Danish physicist Niels Bohr urged
Roosevelt to tell the world about nuclear weaponry and start planning to control atomic energy in order to head off
an international arms race.[4] Roosevelt was more intent on winning the war than worrying about its aftermath, but
Bohr persuaded defense officials Vannevar Bush and James Conant that the wartime stress on secrecy should yield
to the creation of a supranational nuclear control authority. Because other countries soon could acquire the means to
make their own nuclear weapons, they reasoned, international control would be less risky than a nuclear arms race.
Scientists involved in the U.S. atomic bomb program, including Robert Oppenheimer, also tried to convince U.S. and
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British officials of the impending threat of a postwar arms race and of the historic opportunity the bomb provided for
global political cooperation.[5] 
After ordering the nuclear attack on Japan, then-President Truman asserted that Americans alone “must constitute
ourselves trustees of this new force” and directed the Department of State to devise an international control plan.[6]
The resultant Acheson-Lilienthal report stated that the “development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the
development of atomic energy for bombs are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent” and
concluded that no country could be trusted to develop atomic power because even a primarily peaceful program
might provide fissionable materials to build bombs.[7] In June 1946, the United States presented a modified version
of the Acheson-Lilienthal report to the United Nations. However, whereas the original plan envisaged an
International Atomic Development Authority to manage global nuclear activities, Truman’s representative, Bernard
Baruch, inserted language allowing the proposed agency to impose sanctions for minor treaty breaches and to
establish a new, veto-free UN Security Council to deal with major violations.
Baruch asserted that the United States must retain its stock of nuclear bombs (which in June 1946 numbered nine)
until the new agency created a reliable formula for international control and intrusive inspections. The Soviet Union,
which for four years had been racing to develop its own nuclear weapons arsenal, rejected the Baruch plan, viewing
it as a disingenuous effort to freeze and legitimize the global atomic disparity and preserve an unrivaled U.S.
capacity for nuclear coercion. The Soviets also saw intrusive inspections as a threat to their sovereignty. Soviet
Ambassador Andrei Gromyko declared, “The USSR government has no intention of permitting a situation whereby
the national economy of the Soviet Union or particular branches of that economy would be placed under foreign
control.”[8] Instead, Gromyko argued that every U.S. nuclear device must be eliminated prior to the creation of a less
intrusive international control body. Washington refused, and disarmament negotiations broke down.
As the United Nations debated proposals for international arms control, the United States enacted the August 1946
Atomic Energy Act. The act made the entire nuclear program secret and also created an independent, civilian Atomic
Energy Commission to oversee nuclear research and development and to maintain physical control over U.S. nuclear
forces until their release to the military. The commission was responsible for implementing a rigid system of security
classification and export licensing, which effectively banned the release of sensitive data on industrial atomic uses as
well as on the design and manufacture of nuclear explosives, not to mention nuclear material and technology exports.
By these measures and through steps taken to buy up worldwide supplies of uranium and thorium,[9] Washington
tried to prevent additional countries from going nuclear.
Eisenhower’s Military Challenges
Although only two additional countries had joined the nuclear club—the Soviet Union and Great Britain—
Eisenhower abandoned the policies of strict nuclear secrecy and technology denial largely because Moscow’s
growing mastery of nuclear technology meant that it soon would be able to provide other countries peaceful nuclear
assistance. U.S. officials feared that the Kremlin would score a huge propaganda victory, especially in the
developing world, if the United States did not alter its own nuclear export policy. In addition, Moscow’s nuclear
force buildup, starting with its first nuclear detonation in August 1949 and advancing with its thermonuclear weapon
test in August 1953, compelled Washington to devise some countermeasure to the growing Soviet nuclear threat to
U.S. territory.
The strategy Eisenhower approved in October 1953 slashed defense spending, which had spiraled during the Korean
War, and—compared to the previous “containment” policy approved in the famous National Security Council
(NSC)-68 document—established more aggressive requirements for security alliances, covert operations, overseas
propaganda, and nuclear weapons.[10] This “New Look” strategy maintained that a large force of nuclear weapons
was “indispensable for U.S. security” because only a “massive atomic capability” could deter Soviet aggression. In
Eisenhower’s eight years in office, the U.S. nuclear stockpile grew from 1,005 to more than 20,000 weapons.
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Military doctrine changed too. “In the event of hostilities,” the new nuclear strategy stated, “the United States will
consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”[11] Ironically, the United States is now
trying to discourage India and Pakistan from adopting a similar nuclear doctrine.
A Bold Nuclear Initiative
In a celebrated address to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, Eisenhower heralded a new Atoms for
Peace campaign designed to “hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of
people.” The president began his speech by warning of two impending “atomic realities.” First, he advised that the
means to produce nuclear weapons, then possessed by only a few states, would eventually spread to other countries,
“possibly all others.” Next, he affirmed that surprise nuclear attack for the foreseeable future would be a serious
military threat, one which neither “superiority in numbers of weapons” nor powerful defense systems could prevent.
Ultimately, the president’s message was one of hope. He claimed that atomic energy soon could be channeled to
improve the socioeconomic condition of humankind. To redirect nuclear research away from military pursuits and
toward “peaceful...efficient and economic usage,” Eisenhower invited “the governments principally involved” to
“make joint contributions from their stockpiles of...fissionable materials to an international atomic energy
agency...set up under the aegis of the United Nations.”[12] Mandated to collect, store, and distribute fissile materials,
the proposed IAEA would not have the ownership and punishment powers that doomed the chance for agreement on
Baruch’s International Atomic Development Agency. Rather, the new agency and “uranium bank” were intended as
simple steps to establish international trust and draw Moscow into a cooperative arms control dialogue.
U.S. officials realized that the IAEA would take years to establish and thus sought other dramatic proposals to
advance the president’s nuclear initiative. In August 1954, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was revised to allow nuclear
technology and material exports if the recipient country committed not to use these items to develop weapons. U.S.
companies were now free to sell nuclear technology to “strengthen American world leadership and disprove the
Communists’ propaganda charges that the [United States] is concerned solely with the destructive uses of the atom.”
Because U.S. power reactor programs were “unlikely to produce economically competitive atomic power for a
decade or more,”[13] Washington increased funds for its own reactor programs, reoriented these programs to foreign
requirements, and initiated foreign aid and information programs to make potential recipients interested in U.S.
technology. It also provided friendly nations nuclear training, technical information, and help in constructing small
research reactors.
Nuclear Commerce and Proliferation
In March 1955, Eisenhower intensified his efforts to promote peaceful nuclear uses, directing the Atomic Energy
Commission to provide “free world” nations “limited amounts of raw and fissionable materials” as well as generous
assistance for building power reactors. These exports were intended to maintain U.S. global leadership, reduce
Soviet influence, and assure continued access to foreign uranium and thorium supplies.[14] In retrospect, it appears
that these objectives were achieved, but an unintended outcome of Atoms for Peace was the proliferation of
worldwide nuclear research and power programs, several of which eventually would be converted to the production
of nuclear weapons.
Did U.S. policymakers not realize that sharing nuclear information and promoting peaceful nuclear uses could
stimulate the appetite for nuclear weapons and increase the bomb-making capabilities of other nations? They
generally understood the risk. In September 1955, Isador Rabi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission General
Advisory Committee, told State Department nuclear affairs adviser Gerard Smith that, without effective international
controls to prevent the diversion of commercial nuclear facilities to military uses, “even a country like India, when it
had some plutonium production, would go into the weapons business.”[15] As it turned out, the safeguard systems the
United States enacted to ameliorate this risk were inadequate.
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In particular, U.S. officials did not sufficiently enforce their own rules. In order to curb what Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles called the “promiscuous spread” of nuclear arms,[16] the new export policy “ordinarily” required
recipients of U.S. fissile materials or reactors to send used fuel elements to U.S. facilities for chemical processing; to
establish adequate production accounting, inspection, and other control technologies; and eventually to accept IAEA
safeguards.[17] In practice, however, U.S. enforcement of these measures was not very strict, other nuclear supplier
states adopted even more relaxed controls, and the IAEA safeguards system turned out to be looser than originally
envisioned. As a result, foreign nuclear technology recipients such as India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel
slipped through the cracks of the nascent nonproliferation regime.
U.S. officials also were guilty of wishful thinking. They had too much confidence in their ability to control the
nuclear behavior of other countries. To make matters worse, their emphasis on the scientific, commercial, and
political benefits of U.S. nuclear exports prevented them from paying adequate attention to the security needs and
perceptions of recipient countries, several of which would go on to misuse U.S. assistance. Moreover, many officials
at that time believed that they had a responsibility to bring a scientific discovery as revolutionary as that of atomic
energy into widespread application, whatever the risks. As the first Atomic Energy Commission chairman, David
Lilienthal, recalled: “[T]his prodigious effort was predicated on the belief and hope that this great new source of
energy for mankind could produce results as dramatically and decisively beneficial to man as the bomb was
dramatically destructive.”[18] Lilienthal’s successor, Lewis Strauss, expressed this hope in a September 1954 speech:
“It is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy electrical energy too cheap to meter—will know of great
periodic regional famines only as a matter of history—will travel effortlessly over the seas and through the air with a
minimum of danger and at great speeds—and will experience a life-span far longer than ours, as disease yields and
man comes to understand what causes him to age. This is the forecast for an age of peace.”[19] Such optimism in the
ability of U.S. technology to deliver prosperity and peace to the world did not abate until India’s 1974 nuclear
explosive test demonstrated the dangerous potential of “peaceful” nuclear technology.
U.S. Nuclear Assistance
Within a year of Eisenhower’s UN speech, the United States began training foreign scientists at a new School of
Nuclear Science and Engineering at Argonne Laboratory; declassified hundreds of nuclear studies and reports;
sponsored the first UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, where many of the declassified documents
were released; and concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with more than two dozen countries. The United
States was responsible for whetting appetites for nuclear research and development in many countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan, having no prior nuclear program. Even in countries such as India and Israel, where a
strong demand for nuclear technology already existed, Washington mounted a major campaign to increase interest in
nuclear energy. In late 1955, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development put on a large exhibit at
the New Delhi Trade Fair featuring a 30-foot-high reactor diagram, “hot” laboratories, and numerous working
models. Nearly two million Indians attended.[20]
Washington’s promotion of nuclear technology was a particularly high priority in South Asia in the mid-1950s
because it supported two of the Eisenhower administration’s major policy directives: NSC 5409 (“U.S. Policy
toward South Asia”), which the president approved in March 1954 to support “strong, stable and responsible
governments” in a region that is “a major battleground in the Cold War”[21]; and NSC 5507/2 (“Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy”), which he approved in March 1955 to utilize nuclear technology exports to promote the
international and regional interests of the United States. India’s nuclear energy chief, Homi Bhabha, was the last
person that needed to be coaxed. He lobbied to make India the first recipient of U.S. nuclear material under
Washington’s new nuclear export policy. The Atomic Energy Commission sold India 10 tons of heavy water in
February 1955 for use in its Cirus research reactor, a facility Canada had agreed to supply with generous financing.
The United States was so intent on concluding a nuclear supply contract with New Delhi that it offered the heavy
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water four years before the reactor’s completion. U.S. policymakers were especially eager to please India owing to
their concern that, following Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953, “the USSR and Communist China will focus
increasing attention on India in an effort to insure [sic] at least its continued neutralism, and if possible to bring it
closer to the Communist Bloc.”[22] 
Largely because of its own regional security interests, but in some part because of Bhabha’s relentless lobbying, the
United States became India’s leading supplier of nuclear technology and materials. Washington provided New Delhi
with more than $93 million in Atoms for Peace loans and grants between 1954 and 1974, three-quarters of which
subsidized the construction and operation of India’s first power reactor at Tarapur. In a few cases, India and other
countries refused U.S. offers of assistance and tried to bargain for more advanced technologies. For example, when
Washington offered India a standard research reactor deal in May 1955, Bhabha declined and asked instead for the
United States to transfer to India a nuclear power reactor “omitting essential safeguard features,” which Bhabha
called “onerous” and “more or less of an insult to India’s peaceful intentions.” After discussing the matter, U.S.
officials insisted that a reactor sale would be considered but only if India accepted international safeguards.[23] 
Requests by India and other strategically located recipients of U.S. assistance for more than what Washington would
offer became routine. Less than a month after Eisenhower’s UN speech, Indian atomic energy official S. S.
Bhatnagar asked if the United States could establish a “joint enterprise with the Indian Atomic Energy Commission
analogous to the U.S.-UK arrangement with South Africa” and collaborate in the development of Indian uranium
resources.[24] Washington declined. Also in January 1955, Bhabha asked a U.S. embassy official if the Atomic
Energy Commission would provide India with technical information on the effects of nuclear explosions or establish
a joint monitoring station in India to record airborne fragments produced by nuclear explosions.[25] Once again,
Washington indicated that it was “emphatically not interested.” However, U.S. officials never suspected that Bhabha
was trying to produce nuclear weapons, even though the technology and materials he accumulated under Atoms for
Peace enabled India to manufacture and detonate a nuclear device in 1974 and become a full-fledged nuclear-weapon
state in 1998.[26] 
An Imperfect Regime
Critics correctly point out that the road to nuclear weapons production would have been much rockier for India and
Pakistan had the United States not launched Atoms for Peace. The liberal nuclear export policies initiated by the
United States and other Western suppliers in the mid-1950s dramatically reduced the costs of undertaking serious
nuclear research and development for dozens of nations around the world. Proponents of nuclear energy in countries
without a nuclear program before Atoms for Peace, or other countries with foundering programs, were now able to
convince national leaders of the technical and economic feasibility of operating nuclear reactors, uranium-
enrichment plants, and plutonium reprocessing facilities. In a handful of cases, highly determined governments
succeeded in producing nuclear weapons from so-called peaceful nuclear technologies.
That is only part of the story. There are many more instances where the diversion of scientific or industrial nuclear
materials for military uses was detected and defeated by the nonproliferation notions and instruments that began
under Atoms for Peace. Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea are cases in point. The norm of nuclear
nonproliferation; the principle of regulated nuclear commerce; the idea of nuclear safeguards; and the IAEA, which
was supposed to bring all of these tools together, are the linchpins of the current nonproliferation regime. Indeed, the
1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty can be seen as a refined, negotiated expression of Atoms for Peace and follow-
on efforts by the Eisenhower administration.[27] Without doubt, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is imperfect, but
it has managed to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to a single-digit number of states. Even more significant is
the fact that not a single nuclear weapon has been employed as part of a military conflict since the Second World
War. Considering the dire forecasts made in the 1950s and 1960s about the rapid international spread of nuclear arms
and the likelihood of nuclear war,[28] these are outcomes that probably would have pleased Eisenhower and many of
his presidential successors.
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